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The literature on multinational companies (MNCs) has gathered interesting
pieces of evidence regarding both ﬁnancing decisions and the ability to shift
income from high- to low-tax jurisdictions.1 It is well-known, indeed, that
income can be shifted by means of debt policies, and that the amount of in-
come shifted depends on tax rate diﬀerentials.2 Moreover we know that debt
policies are aﬀected not only by tax factors but also by other determinants,
such as distress costs and risk.3
The aim of this article is twofold: we address both a positive and a nor-
mative point. The former regards the interactions between income shifting
and debt strategies in a stochastic context. It is worth noting that so far
the literature on income shifting has mainly focused on ﬁnancial strategies
in a deterministic context (see e.g. Altshuler and Grubert, 2003, and Mintz
and Smart, 2004). To enrich the analysis we introduce business, default and
policy risk, as well as default costs. In doing so we provide a theoretical
framework which, by accounting for the above evidence, allows to better
understand the eﬀects of income shifting on the ﬁnancing strategies of a
representative MNC.
The latter (normative) issue regards tax competition. We study how
governments’ ﬁscal policies can be aﬀected by MNCs’ strategies. In particular
we analyze the behavior of two governments which compete to attract income.
We then show that ﬁnancial choices may aﬀect the equilibrium tax rates
levied by the competing governments.
This article is related to two streams of literature. The ﬁrst deals with
ﬁrms’ optimal capital structure. According to this approach, optimal leverage
is reached when the marginal beneﬁto fd e b tﬁnancing (which is due to the
deductibility of interest expenses) equates its marginal cost (which is related
to the expected cost of default).4 We thus analyze the eﬀects of taxation on
ﬁnancial choices, and measure the impact of both default and policy risk on
1Income shifting activities are for instance dealt with by Altshuler and Grubert (2003),
Graham and Tucker (2005), and Mintz (2000). Further evidence on the interactions be-
tween taxation and debt choices is provided by Mintz and Weichenrieder (2005).
2See e.g. Hines (1999), Mills and Newberry (2004) and Mintz and Smart (2004).
3Desai et al. (2004) show that political risk encourages MNCs to use greater debt.
Fan et al. (2003) make a cross-country comparison supporting the idea that business risk
discourages debt issues.
4For further details on this approach see e.g. Leland (1994).
2the optimal capital structure of a representative MNC. To show this we will
introduce two well-known default conditions, which refer to protected debt,
and unprotected debt ﬁnancing, respectively.5
Under protected debt ﬁnancing default may be triggered when the ﬁrms’
asset value falls to the debt’s value. Under unprotected debt ﬁnancing the
MNC has a higher degree of ﬁnancial ﬂexibility. If indeed there is a threat of
default, the parent ﬁrm could decide to convert intra-ﬁrm debt into equity in
order to prevent default.6 Therefore, unprotected debt ﬁnancing implies that
default timing is optimally chosen by the MNC. When the subsidiary’s net
cash ﬂow is negative, the parent company can decide to inject further equity
capital in order to meet the subsidiary’s debt obligations and delay default.
As long as it issues new capital and pays the interest rate it can thus exploit
future recoveries in the ﬁrm’s proﬁtability.7
As pointed out by Leland (1994) both protected and unprotected debt
are widely used. In particular, minimum net-worth requirements, implied by
protected debt, are common in short-term debt ﬁnancing, whereas long-term
debt instruments are usually unprotected or only partially protected.
The second stream of research we refer to deals with tax competition.8 It
is worth noting that most of this literature does not deal with risk.9 Moreover,
as Wilson and Wildasin (2004, p.1084) point out, "analysis of the interaction
between factor mobility, the structure of ﬁnancial markets and institutions
... is still at an early stage". By merging the above streams we thus aim to
provide a better understanding of possible interactions between MNCs’ poli-
cies and governments’ strategies. In particular, we show that the equilibrium
tax rates of two competing governments depend on the default condition ap-
plied, namely on the characteristics of debt. We also prove that an increase
in either the cost of default or the cost of income shifting raises tax rates.
Moreover, we show that an increase in credibility, i.e. a lower risk of expro-
priation, allows governments to set higher tax rates. Finally, we ﬁnd that
5For a detailed analysis of debt protection see e.g. Smith and Warner (1977).
6I wish to thank Clemens Fuest who raised this point when reading a previous version
of this article.
7In this case, the MNC behaves as if it owned a put option, whose exercise leads to
default.
8Recent evidence on tax competition is provided by Devereux et al. (2004).
9A few exceptions are Gordon and Varian (1989) and Lee (2004). See also Panteghini
and Schjelderup (2006) who deal with MNCs’ investment strategies and their interactions
with governments’ policies.
3both business and default risk reduce the MNC’s propensity to borrow and
lead to higher tax rates.
The structure of the article is as follows. Section 2 describes the model.
Section 3 deals with the ﬁnancing strategies of a representative MNC, that
can shift income from one country to another. Section 4 uses a two-country
model to investigate how MNCs’ strategies can aﬀect governments’ policies.
Section 5 summarises the main ﬁndings and derives policy implications.
2T h e m o d e l
In this section we introduce a model describing the ﬁnancial strategies of a
representative MNC resident in country A, and owning a subsidiary located
in country B. The subsidiary can borrow from a perfectly competitive credit
sector, which is characterized by a given risk-free interest rate r,a n db y
symmetric information. The following assumptions hold:
1. the parent company produces a given amount ΨA of operating proﬁts
i ni t sh o m ec o u n t r y ;
2. the EBIT (Earning Before Interest and Taxes) of the foreign subsidiary,
deﬁned as ΠB (t), follows a geometric Brownian motion
dΠB (t)
ΠB (t)
= σdzB (t), with ΠB (0) ≥ 0, (1)
where σ is the instantaneous standard deviation of
dΠB(t)
ΠB(t) ,a n ddzB (t)
is the increment of a Wiener process;10
3. at time 0, the subsidiary borrows some resources and pays a constant
coupon which cannot be renegotiated;
4. default occurs when the subsidiary does not meet its debt obligations;
5. the cost of default is proportional to the coupon received;
10The general form of the geometric Brownian motion is dΠB (t)=µΠB (t)dt +
σΠB (t)dzB where µ is the expected rate of growth. If shareholders are risk neutral
in equilibrium we have µ = r − δ, where r is the risk-free interest rate and δ is the con-
venience yield (see e.g. McDonald and Siegel, 1985). With no loss of generality, in (1) we
set µ = r − δ =0 .
46. the MNC believes that there is some positive probability λdt that the
foreign government expropriates its subsidiary during the short interval
dt.
The above assumptions deserve some comments. Assumption 1 states that
the operating proﬁts of the parent company (ΨA) are exogenously given,
whereas, according to Assumption 2, the subsidiary’s EBIT is stochastic.
These two hypotheses allow us not only to analyze the eﬀects of foreign
business risk on the parent company in a tractable way,11 but also to account
for the fact that MNCs are an important channel for the transmission of
country-speciﬁcs h o c k s . 12
In line with Leland (1994), Assumption 3 entails that the MNC sets a
coupon and then computes the market value of debt. In the absence of
arbitrage, this is equivalent to ﬁrst set, the value of debt and then, compute
the eﬀective interest rate under the non-arbitrage condition. For simplicity
we also assume that debt cannot be renegotiated.13
Assumption 4 introduces the risk of default for the subsidiary. Given (1),
it is assumed that if the subsidiary’ EBIT falls to a given threshold value, the
subsidiary is expropriated by the lender, and the parent company becomes a
domestic ﬁrm with a gross cash ﬂow equal to ΨA. As we pointed out in the
introduction we will use the following alternative deﬁnitions of default.14
Deﬁnition 1 Under protected debt ﬁnancing, default takes place when ΠB
falls to an exogenously given threshold point Π
p
B.
Deﬁnition 2 Under unprotected debt ﬁnancing, the threshold point Π
u
B is
chosen optimally by shareholders at time 0.
A c c o r d i n gt oD e ﬁnition 1, default may be triggered when the subsidiary’s
payoﬀ falls to the exogenously given threshold point Π
p
B. The second deﬁn-
ition regards unprotected debt. This condition implies that default timing
11If both ΨA and ΠB were stochastic, the MNC’s overall pre-tax operating proﬁt
(ΨA + ΠB) would not follow the Markov Properties. Thus we would fail to obtain a
closed-form solution.
12As shown by Desai and Foley (2004), rates of return and investment rates of aﬃliates
are highly correlated with the rates of return and investment of the aﬃliate’s parent and
other aﬃliates within the same group.
13For an analysis of debt renegotiation see e.g. Goldstein et al. (2001).
14For further details on default conditions see Smith and Warner (1977), and Leland
(1994). For a study of corporate taxation under default risk see also Panteghini (2004,
2006).
5is optimally chosen by the MNC. When the subsidiary’s net cash ﬂow is
negative, indeed the parent company can decide to inject equity and exploit
future recoveries in the subsidiary’s payoﬀ.
In the event of default, the lender faces a sunk cost, which is proportional
to the coupon paid (Assumption 5). It is worth noting that the quality of
results does not change if we assume that the cost of default is proportional
to the ﬁrm value, rather than to the debt value.
Finally, Assumption 6 describes the MNC’s beliefs on the credibility of
future government policy. In particular, it is assumed that the MNC fears
that the foreign government may expropriate its subsidiary. Since such an
expropriation is a sudden event, we model policy risk as a Poisson process,
where λdt is the instantaneous ap r i o r iprobability that expropriation occurs
in the short interval dt.
Let us next introduce taxation. For simplicity we assume that the tax
system is fully symmetric and follows the source principle.15 We also assume
that the MNC can shift a percentage γA of the coupon paid by the foreign
subsidiary. However, shifting income by means of intra-ﬁrm borrowing and
lending is costly. The cost of income shifting is due to two main factors:
one is related to advising activities and the other is due anti-avoidance rules.
On the one hand, shifting income usually requires the costly advice of tax
and ﬁnancial experts. On the other hand, countries aim to prevent tax-
avoiding practices by introducing ad hoc rules, such as thin capitalization
and Controlled-Foreign-Company (CFC) rules.16
The cost function ν (γA) we use is convex in γA.17 Deﬁning τA and τB as
the tax rate of country A and B, respectively, we can write the overall proﬁt
function of the MNC as
Y
N




















B is the coupon paid to the lender. The term j = p,u stands for pro-
tected and unprotected, respectively. In line with Desai and Foley’s (2004)
empirical ﬁndings, the overall proﬁt function (2) is aﬀected by the transmis-
15Notice that the existence of deferral possibilities and limited credit rules leads to the
application of the source principle (see e.g. Keen, 1993).
16For further details on this point see Fuest and Hemmelgarn (2005).
17In line with Panteghini and Schjelderup (2006) we assume that the cost of income
shifting is non deductible. See also Hauﬂer and Schjelderup (2000) for a discussion on this
point.
6sion of country B’s shock. Manipulating (2) one obtains
Y
N
A (ΠB (t)) = (1 − τA)ΨA +( 1− τB)ΠB (t) − (1 − e τ)C
j
B,
where e τ ≡ τB +φ(γA) is the eﬀective tax beneﬁt arising from the deduction
o ft h ec o u p o n . A sc a nb es e e n ,e τ accounts for the net beneﬁto fi n c o m e
shifting, i.e. φ(γA) ≡ [(τA − τB)γA − ν (γA)].At r a d e - o ﬀ arises from debt
ﬁnancing. On the one hand, interest deductibility ensures a tax beneﬁt. On
the other hand, debt may cause default. Such a trade-oﬀ will then induce
the MNC to choose the subsidiary’s optimal leverage ratio. Since the tax
beneﬁt e τ depends on income reporting strategies, i.e. on φ(γA),i tw i l lt h e n
be straightforward to show that ﬁnancial choices are aﬀected by tax shifting
activities.








where n ≥ 0 m e a s u r e sh o wc o s t l yi ti sf o rt h eM N Ct os h i f ti n c o m ef r o mo n e
country to the other. If thus n goes to zero, the ﬁrm can shift proﬁta tn o
cost. If, instead, n goes to inﬁnity, income shifting is too costly.
As we pointed out, the cost of income shifting is due to institutional
determinants as well as to tax and ﬁnancial advising activities. In particular,
the introduction of thin capitalization and CFC devices, aiming to prevent
tax avoiding activities, raises n. Moreover the decrease in the cost of tax
sheltering operations, which is linked to the degradation of book and tax






[(τA − τB)γA − ν (γA)]. (3)







As shown in (4), the optimal percentage of income shifted is reached when the
marginal gain in terms of tax savings, here expressed by tax rate diﬀerential
18In particular, ﬁnancial engineering has reduced the cost of recharacterizing proﬁts to
avoid taxation. On this point see e.g. Desai (2003, 2005).
7(τB − τA), is equal to the marginal cost of income shifting.19 If therefore
τA >τ B the ﬁrm shifts income from country A to country B and vice versa.20








3 The MNC’s capital structure
The framework so far obtained accounts for interesting characteristics of
MNCs, such as the use of debt for tax-motivated income reporting strategies,
under business, default and policy risk. In this section we show how these
features may aﬀect the ﬁnancing strategies of the representative MNC. For
simplicity, hereafter we will omit the time variable t.
In order to ﬁnd the MNC’s optimal capital structure, we must ﬁrst com-







A (ΠB), with j = p,u, (6)
where D
j
A (ΠB) and E
j
A (ΠB) are the value of debt and equity, respectively.
Let us ﬁrst calculate the value of debt, under the assumption that, before
default, the lender is tax exempt.21 When, in the event of default, the lender
becomes shareholder, however, it is subject to the source-based tax levied
on the subsidiary. According to Assumption 5, moreover, we set the cost of
default equal to υCB, where the parameter υ>0 measures the impact of
default on the lender’s proﬁtability.
19The fact that statutory tax rates are a fairly important factor that inﬂuences income
shifting decisions is well supported by empirical ﬁndings. On this point see e.g. Hines
(1999), Desai et al. (2004), and Mills and Newberry (2004).
20In our model the optimal percentage of income shifting γ∗
A is not state contingent.
This symplifying assumption implies that the choice of γ∗
A aﬀects the MNC’s ﬁnancial
decisions but does not depend on such decisions.
21It is well-known that eﬀective tax rates on capital income are fairly low. With no loss
of generality we thus assume that the lender’s pre-default tax burden is nil.
83.1 The debt value
Given the default threshold point Π
j










































σ2 < 0. A ss h o w ni n( 7 ) ,t h ev a l u eo fd e b t
accounts for the risk of expropriation (i.e. parameter λ). In line with Dixit
and Pindyck (1994), we account for this risk as follows: we regard the lender’s









perpetual rent computed with the augmented discount rate (r + λ).T h e
second term accounts for any future expected change in proﬁtability caused







measures the present value of
1 Euro contingent on the event default. After default, the lender becomes




r+λ , with j = p,u.
3.2 The equity value
Let us next compute the value of equity. According to Assumption 4, when
default occurs the parent company loses its subsidiary and receives a net
operating proﬁte q u a lt o(1 − τA)ΨA. Thus the value of equity is simply equal
to the perpetual rent
(1−τA)ΨA
r .22 Before default, the MNC must account for
the risk of expropriation of its subsidiary. As shown in Appendix B, therefore,
we have
22Notice that, given the discount rate r, the MNC assumes that the risk of expropriation



















































r+λ measures the net beneﬁt arising from the own-
ership of the subsidiary. As can be seen, this term is equal to the present






sures the value of ﬁnancial ﬂexibility under unprotected debt ﬁnancing. As
we pointed out, the MNC has opportunity to inject equity (or, equivalently,
convert intra-debt into equity) in order to delay default and exploit future tax
avoidance beneﬁts, as well as any recovery in the subsidiary’s proﬁtability.
We can now compute the default threshold points under protected and
unprotected debt ﬁnancing. According to Deﬁnition 1, protected debt ﬁ-
nancing means that the default threshold point Π
p
B is exogenously given. We
assume that Π
p









=( 1− τA)ΨA +( 1− τB)Π
p
B − (1 − e τ)C
j










Let us next compute the threshold value under unprotected debt ﬁnanc-
ing. Following Leland (1994), Π
u









Substituting (8) into (10) we can compute the MNC’s default trigger















B are proportional to the
coupon paid, and are instead independent of the current EBIT.
23The quality of results does not change if we assume a diﬀerent threshold value.
10Comparing (9) with (11) it is straightforward to show that, coeteris




B holds. Under unprotected debt ﬁnancing,
the MNC can inject equity in order to meet the subsidiary’s debt obligations.
This means that, relative to the protected case, the MNC postpones default.
Moreover, it is easy to show that Eu
A (ΠB) >E
p
A (ΠB). Such a diﬀerence is
due to the fact that under unprotected debt ﬁnancing, the MNC is endowed
with a put option (i.e. the option to default). This makes the claim more
valuable.24
L e tu sa n a l y z et h ee ﬀects on tax avoidance on the default threshold points.
It is straightforward to show that whenever tax avoidance is allowed we
have e τ>τ B,a n dt h ei n e q u a l i t y 1−h τ
1−τB < 1 t h u sh o l d s . G i v e n( 9 )a n d( 1 1 ) ,
therefore, we can write the following:
Lemma 1 Tax avoidance leads to a postponement of delay.
3.3 The optimal coupon




























U s i n g( 1 2 )w ec a nn o wﬁnd the optimal coupon. As shown by Leland








Solving (13) we obtain the optimal coupon (Appendix C)
24Given the inequality Eu
A (ΠB) >E
p
A (ΠB) we might wonder why ﬁrms use protected
debt as well. In fact unprotected debt would be preferable for shareholders. As pointed
out by Leland (1994), protected debt may be preferred if agency costs are assumed. In
particular protected debt may induce shareholders not to increase ﬁrm risk at the expense
of the lender. However this point is beyond the scope of our article.
25The maximization of the MNC’s overall value (including debt) implicitly rules out
any agency conﬂict between shareholders and the lender. As pointed out in the previous








j¢−1 1 − τB









with mp =1and mu =
β2
β2−1.














debt ﬁnancing the MNC can decide when to default. Its higher ﬂexibility
thus allows the MNC to raise leverage.
As shown in (14), C
j
B is proportional to the current EBIT, ΠB,a n di s




∂h τ > 0. This means
that the greater is the beneﬁt arising from borrowing, i.e. e τ, the higher the
optimal coupon is. Not surprisingly an increase in e τ stimulates borrowing.




∂υ < 0. T h i sm e a n st h a ta ni n c r e a s ei nt h e
sunk cost of default (i.e. in υ) reduces the propensity to borrow.26
Let us next analyze the impact of income shifting on the capital structure.
We can prove the following:
Lemma 2 If τA 6= τB ad e c r e a s ei nn raises the optimal coupon CB.
Proof- See Appendix D.
The intuition behind Lemma 2 is straightforward: a reduction in the cost
of income shifting encourages tax avoidance, and thus raises the tax beneﬁt
of debt ﬁnancing. Such an increase stimulates the issue of debt and thus
induces the MNC to pay a higher coupon.
L e tu sn e x ta n a l y z et h ee ﬀects of risk on the MNC’s debt strategy. Given
the above results we can write the following















Proof- See Appendix E.
The intuition behind these results is straightforward. If the cost of default







. In line with Leland
(1994), indeed, an increase in volatility makes the costly event of default
26A detailed comparative statics analysis is provided by Leland (1994) and Goldstein et
al. (2001).








.T h i si sd u et ot h ef a c tt h a tar i s ei nλ increases the discount
rate (r + λ). Thus the present value of 1 Euro contingent on the event of
default is reduced. The decrease in the expected cost of default induces the
MNC to borrow more resources (or, equivalently, to pay a higher coupon).
As regards unprotected debt, the quality of results does not change.28 We
have thus provided a rationale for the positive eﬀect of policy risk on debt
ﬁnancing, which has been found (but not explained) by Desai et al. (2004).








for diﬀe r e n tv a l u e so fσ2 and λ. As regards the tax rates, we follow
Mills and Newberry (2004), and set the home corporate tax rate (τA)e q u a l
to the U.S. one, i.e. 0.35, and the foreign one (τB) equal to the average
statutory rate levied on foreign income, which is about 0.32. We thus obtain
τA−τB =0 .03. Moreover, we follow Goldstein et al. (2001), and set υ =0 .05.
It is worth noting that such a value is lower than those usually assumed in
the relevant literature.29 Setting r =0 .045 and focusing on protected debt
we thus obtain the results depicted in Fig. 1.
Despite the use of a fairly low value of υ, results are in line with Lemma 3:








of results does not change if we assume unprotected debt.
27As we pointed out in the introduction this result is in line with the empirical ﬁndings
of Fan et al. (2003).







∂β2 to be positive, we need a lower value of υ.
29For instance Branch (2002) estimates a total default-related cost ranging between
12.7% and 20.5%. However, Goldstein et al. (2001) criticize the existing literature in that
it usually assumes too high costs.








144 The competitive equilibrium
In this section we model tax competition between two small open countries,
called A and B. We assume that, in each country, there exists a MNC which
owns a foreign subsidiary and chooses its optimal capital structure. We thus
use the MNC studied in the previous section, deﬁned as MNC A, and then
add a second MNC, named MNC B, with headquarter in country B, and a
subsidiary operating in A. These MNCs face the same income shifting cost,
i.e. ν (γk) with k = A,B.
Using the notation of Section 3, we deﬁne ΨB as the ﬁrm’s operating
proﬁt earned in country B (i.e. in MNC B’s home country), and C
j
A as the
coupon paid to the lender. Moreover, ΠA is the stochastic EBIT faced by the
subsidiary, which is driven by the geometric Brownian motion
dΠA
ΠA = σdzA,
with ΠA ≥ 0. The overall proﬁt earned by MNC B is therefore
Y
N


















Given the above assumptions, we have two country-speciﬁc shocks: namely
the shock faced by MNC A when investing in country B and the one faced
by MNC B when investing in country A.30
Let us next compute the governments’ objective functions, under the as-
sumption that 100% of the MNC resident in the home country is held by
domestic households.31 Moreover we assume that, despite MNCs’ beliefs
regarding policy risk, governments do not aim to expropriate foreign sub-
sidiaries. Therefore the governments’ objective functions do not embody the
value of the foreign subsidiary, and are thus equal to the value of the resi-
dent MNC plus the present value of net tax revenues. The government A’s
objective function consists of ﬁve terms:



















30The quality of results does not change if we assume that these two shocks are corre-
lated.
31Such a home-bias is well documented in the literature. However some recent articles
have shown that it has declined over the last decade (see e.g. Sørensen et al., 2005).














with τ0 ≡ τA + φ(γB).
152. the present value of tax revenues gathered from the resident MNC,
which is equal to the perpetual rent
τAΨA
r ;
3. the present value of taxes paid by the foreign subsidiary: since taxes
are paid irrespective of the ﬁrm’s ownership, they are not contingent
o nt h ee v e n to fd e f a u l ta n da r et h u se q u a lt oap e r p e t u a lﬂow; given
the initial income produced by the foreign subsidiary ΠA, the present
value of tax revenues is
τAΠA
r ;
4. the net loss of revenues caused by income shifting from the parent


























5. the net loss of revenues due to income shifting from the parent company


























As can be seen, both (17) and (18) are conditional on the event of default.
This is due to the fact that, whenever default takes place, debt turns into
equity. Since the lender becomes shareholder, any tax beneﬁt due to debt
ﬁnancing vanishes.

















































r with j = p,u.
(19)
33Notice that the governments do not account for the costs of proﬁts h i f t i n g .
16Following the same procedure we also obtain the government B’s objective
function.34





k k = A,B. (20)
The maximization of (20) is part of a sequential game, where at stage 1 the
governments set the tax rates, and at stage 2 the two MNCs will decide both
their debt-equity ratio and the percentage of income shifting. Solving (20)
we can prove the following:
Proposition 1 If n is low enough, a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium tax
rate τ∗   (0,1] exists. The equilibrium tax rate under protected debt ﬁnancing
is higher than that obtained under unprotected debt ﬁnancing.
Proof See Appendix G.
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is straightforward. The equilibrium
tax rate is τ∗   (0,1] on condition that n is low enough, i.e. income shifting
is proﬁtable enough.
The eﬀect of default conditions on the equilibrium tax rates can be ex-




under unprotected debt ﬁnancing the ﬁrm’s leverage is higher, for any given
percentage of income shifted γ∗
k, tax avoidance ensures a greater beneﬁt. Rel-
ative to the protected-debt case, therefore, the governments are thus obliged
to decrease tax rates in order to reduce such a tax beneﬁt. As a consequence,
the equilibrium tax rate under unprotected debt ﬁnancing is lower.
Proposition 1 is obtained by assuming that the objective function does
not account for all the ﬁrm’s value but only for equity value. However, it is
easy to prove the following:
Corollary 1 The equilibrium tax rate is unchanged if the objective func-
tion also accounts for the value of debt.
















































17Proof See Appendix H.
Corollary 1 shows that the result of Proposition 1 is unaﬀected by the
change in the governments’ objective functions. The intuition behind Corol-
lary 1 is straightforward: as the credit market is perfectly competitive, all
proﬁts accrue to shareholders. Therefore adding the value of debt to the
objective function does not increase the relevant tax base. The equilibrium
t a xr a t ei st h u su n c h a n g e d .
Let us next provide some comparative statics regarding τ∗.W e ﬁrst
analyze the impact of the default and the income shifting costs. We can
prove the following:
Proposition 2 An increase in either the cost of default (i.e. in υ) or the
cost of shifting income (i.e. n) causes an increase in τ∗.
Proof See Appendix I.
As shown in Proposition 2 both the distress and the income shifting cost
have a positive impact on the equilibrium tax rates. An increase in υ raises
the expected cost of default and thus discourages the use of debt. Coeteris
paribus,ar i s ei nυ reduces the optimal coupon and, given γ∗
k, the amount
of income shifted from one country to the other. By discouraging income
shifting, the increase in υ allows the competing governments to reach a higher
equilibrium tax rate. This result has an interesting implication: both default
procedures and debtors’ protection rights (à la La Porta et al., 1997) can
aﬀect governments’ ﬁscal strategies.
A similar reasoning holds for n.A ni n c r e a s ei nn makes income shifting
m o r ec o s t l y : t h i sa l l o w st h eg o v e r n m e n t st os e tah i g h e rτ∗. This result
has an interesting policy implication: as long as governments can aﬀect the
value of n, e.g. by means of more stringent anti-avoidance rules (such as thin
capitalization and CFC rules), they can set a higher tax rate. This helps to
explain the widespread introduction of these devices throughout the world.
On the other hand, both the diﬀusion of sophisticated ﬁnancial engineering
activities and the decrease in tax consulting expenses may cause a reduction
in n, and therefore lead to a decrease in τ∗.
L e tu sn e x ta n a l y z et h ei m p a c to fσ and λ on the equilibrium tax rate.
Like in Fig. 1 we focus on the protected-debt case. Using the same parameter
values of the case depicted in Fig. 1 (i.e. υ =0 .05,r=0 .045, n =0 .5)w e
show that an increase in λ leads to a decrease in the equilibrium tax rate.
18Figure 2: The eﬀect of λ on the equilibrium tax rate τ∗.
The intuition behind this result is as follows: an increase in λ stimulates







, with k = A,B. Given the optimal
percentage γ∗
k, therefore, a greater amount of income can be shifted. In order
to oﬀset the increase in income shifting opportunities, governments are thus
induced to set lower tax rates.
This result has an interesting policy implication: an increase in credibility,
i.e. a lower value of λ, allows governments to set higher tax rates. In this
model we have used an one-shot game and assumed the absence of any debt
renegotiation. If we enriched the framework by assuming a repeated game
between governments and by allowing MNCs to renegotiate debt, we then
would expect a positive relationship between reputation and the level of tax
19Figure 3: The eﬀect of σ on the equilibrium tax rate τ∗.
rates.35
As shown in the previous Section, an increase in σ discourages borrowing,







. Coeteris paribus, therefore, income shifting
is discouraged, and the governments can set higher tax rates (see Fig. 3). The
quality of results does not change if we focus on unprotected debt ﬁnancing.
Let us ﬁnally compare the last result with Panteghini and Schjelderup
(2006), who show that an increase in volatility discourages FDIs and thus
reduces the overall number of multinational ﬁrms. In their case, the policy
35This point has some similarities with Cherian and Perotti (2001), who show that a
gradual increase in reputation allows governments to attract a greater amount of FDIs.
20response is therefore to lower the tax rate in order to alleviate the negative
impact of increased volatility. In this model, however, we analyze MNCs’
strategies when FDI has already been undertaken and income can be shifted
by means of debt ﬁnancing. This explains the diﬀerent results obtained.
5 Concluding remarks and policy implications
In this article we have studied the interactions between ﬁnancial policies and
income shifting activities of MNCs in a stochastic environment. In the ﬁrst
part we have shown that income shifting both 1) raises the tax beneﬁto f
debt ﬁnancing, thereby stimulating debt ﬁnancing, and 2) delays default.
In the second part of the article we have analyzed the impact of MNCs’
strategies on the behavior of two competing governments. In line with Wilson
and Wildasin’s (2004), we have studied how the structure of ﬁnancial markets
and institutions may matter in terms of ﬁscal policies. We have therefore
shown that the characteristics of debt ﬁnancing can aﬀect the governments’
strategies. In particular the equilibrium tax rate is lower under unprotected
debt ﬁnancing than under protected debt ﬁnancing.
Moreover, we have found that an increase in either the cost of default
or the cost of income shifting raises the equilibrium tax rate. These results
have some interesting policy implications. First of all, the cost of default may
aﬀect governments’ tax strategies. In particular, both default procedures and
debtors’ protection rights are expected to aﬀect governments’ ﬁscal strategies.
Also, more stringent anti-avoidance devices, such as thin capitalization and
CFC rules, allow governments to set higher tax rates.
Finally, we have shown that risk has an ambiguous impact on govern-
ments’ strategies. On the one hand, policy risk (related to MNCs’ beliefs
that governments may expropriate foreign activities) reduces the equilibrium
tax rate. On the other hand, an increase in both business and default risk
leads to higher tax rates.
There are at least two topics that still need to be looked at. First of all,
here we have assumed that tax rates are the only policy tool in the hand of the
two competing governments. A natural extension of the model would then be
the introduction of a second policy tool regarding the tax base. Secondly, this
article proposes some testable hypotheses regarding the interactions between
MNCs’ activities and governments’ policies. These ﬁndings are left for future
empirical investigation.
21AD e r i v a t i o n o f ( 7 )




































































B . The general




























where β1 and β2 are, respectively, the positive and negative roots of the
characteristic equation σ2





i for i =1 ,2, we introduce three boundary con-
ditions. First of all we assume that whenever ΠB goes to zero the lender’s
claim is nil, namely condition D
j
A (0) = 0 holds. This implies that B
j
2 =0 .





1 =0 .37 Thirdly, we must consider that at point ΠB = Π
j
B, the













37For further details on these boundary conditions see e.g. Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
22pre-default value of debt must be equal to the post-default one, net of the





































Given the above results it is straightforward to obtain (7).
B Derivation of (8) and (11)
To derive the value of equity we must remember that default causes an ex-
propriation of the subsidiary. This means that whenever we have ΠB = Π
j
B,













that is the fair value of the parent company when operating as a domestic
ﬁrm.
Applying dynamic programming we next write the added value due to
the ownership of a foreign subsidiary. Given the additional after-tax cash
ﬂow due to holding the subsidiary, i.e.
£
Y N
A (ΠB) − (1 − τA)ΨA
¤
, the added










A (ΠB) − (1 − τA)ΨA
¤
dt +( 1− λdt)e−rdtξ [E(ΠB + dΠB)] before default.
(26)
As can be seen (26) embodies the net beneﬁt arising from income shifting,
and accounts for the risk of expropriation (i.e. the MNC’s fear that the
government expropriates its subsidiary). Using Itô’s Lemma, eliminating all











































L e tu sn e x tc o m p u t eA
j
i with i =1 ,2. In the absence of ﬁnancial bubbles, we
have A
j
1 =0for j = p,u. Moreover to compute A
j
2 we let the two branches




































































with j = p,u.
B.1 Equity value under protected debt
Recall that under full debt protection, we have Π
p
B = 1−h τ
1−τBC
j
B. In this case
we have therefore A
p












B.2 Equity value under unprotected debt
Under unprotected debt, instead, the MNC must solve (10). Using (29) one



































































Finally, using (30) and (31) one easily obtains (8).
C The optimal coupon
Let us solve problem (13). Using (12) and diﬀerentiating with respect to C
j
B,






































































e τ +( r + λ)υ
(33)
Substituting (9) and (11) into (33) yields (14).
D Proof of Lemma 2




























































∂n < 0. The Lemma is thus proven.¥
E Proof of Lemma 3
































































































∂λ < 0,a n d∂mu
∂β2 < ∂mp






































to be positive. This proves the Lemma.¥
26FD e r i v a t i o n o f ( 1 7 ) a n d ( 1 8 )
Let us compute the present value of the net loss of revenues due to income
shifting from the parent company placed in A and its subsidiary operating




















































B . In the absence of ﬁnancial bubbles the














L e tu sn e x tc o m p u t eN
j
2. We know that when default occurs the net ﬂow






holds. Substituting (38) into the condition (39) it is easy to obtain (17).
Following the same procedure we can compute the present value of the
net loss of revenues due to proﬁt shifting from the parent company placed in
B and its subsidiary operating in A (18).
G Proof of Proposition 1
To prove Proposition 1 let us focus on the decision of the government A.
Substituting (19) into (20) and diﬀerentiating the objective function with
38Remember that NB
j
B (ΠB) is computed by the government, that by assumption does
not aim to expropriate the foreign subsidiary.















































































































































































k =0 , Πk = Π,
C
j

























































































τ +( r + λ)υ
¸1− 1
β2
[(1 − β2)(r + λ)υ − β2τ].
(43)
Let us analyze the RHS of (43). It is easy to ascertain that Rp (0) = 0,
∂Rp(τ)
∂τ > 0 for τ ≥ 0, and limτ→∞ Rp (τ)=∞. As shown in Fig. 4 therefore
there exists one point τ∗ such that the equality (43) holds. If n is high enough
we have τ∗ ∈ (0,1].
28Figure 4: The equilibrium condition (43).
29G.2 Unprotected debt































































Under symmetry we have ∂h τ


















































τ +( r + λ)υ
.









It is thus easy to ascertain that Ru (0) = 0,
∂Ru(τ)
∂τ > 0 for τ ≥ 0, and
limτ→∞ Ru (τ)=∞. Moreover we know from (46) that Ru (τ) >R p (τ).
This entails that the equality Ru (τ)=1holds for a lower value of τ.A s
a consequence, the equilibrium tax rate is lower under unprotected debt
ﬁnancing. This concludes the proof.¥
30HP r o o f o f C o r o l l a r y 1
To prove Corollary 1 let us add the value of debt (i.e. (7)) to the objective


































































































































































































































































































































39Following the same procedure it is straightforward to obtain the objective function of
government B.
31As can be seen eq. (49) collapses to (41). This is suﬃcient to prove that
the equilibrium tax rate is the same as that obtained in Proposition 1. The
C o r o l l a r yi st h u sp r o v e n . ¥.
I Proof of Proposition 2





∂n < 0. This eﬀect is depicted in Fig. 5. As can be seen, an increase
in either υ or n shifts curve R(τ) downwards.
Therefore the equilibrium tax rate increases from τ∗
0 to τ∗
1.
A similar result can be obtained under unprotected debt ﬁnancing. Ac-
cording to Proposition 1, however, the equilibrium tax rate is lower than that
obtained in the protected-debt case. This concludes the proof.¥
32Figure 5: The eﬀe c to fa ni n c r e a s ei nn and/or υ on the equilibrium tax rate
τ∗.
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